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Table of Contents Link to heading

On September 18, 2025, Optus experienced a major network outage that disrupted Triple Zero (000) emergency services across several Australian states. The outage lasted over 13 hours and resulted in four confirmed deaths and hundreds of failed emergency calls. This tragic event has reignited scrutiny over Optus’s infrastructure and regulatory compliance—especially in light of a similar outage in November 2023, which had already exposed critical vulnerabilities in the telco’s emergency systems.

What Went Wrong in 2025 Link to heading

The September 2025 outage was triggered during a routine firewall upgrade. A misconfiguration blocked emergency call traffic, and the backup system—known as the “camp-on” mechanism, which allows mobile phones to switch to another network for emergency calls—also failed. This dual failure meant that Optus customers in South Australia, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory were unable to reach emergency services.

Among the victims were an eight-week-old baby, a 68-year-old woman, a 74-year-old man, and a 49-year-old man. The company’s delayed response and failure to notify emergency services promptly worsened the situation.

The 2023 Outage: A Missed Warning Link to heading

In November 2023, Optus suffered a nationwide outage that disrupted internet, mobile, and fixed-line services for over 12 hours. The cause was a routing error during a software upgrade. That incident affected millions of users and led to over 2,000 failed emergency calls. Optus was fined and subjected to a government review, which recommended 18 reforms to improve emergency call reliability.

However, by 2025, only 12 of those reforms had been implemented. The recurrence of similar failures suggests that lessons from the 2023 outage were not fully learned or acted upon.

Systemic Issues and Regulatory Gaps Link to heading

The repeated failures point to deeper systemic problems:

  • Emergency call systems were not sufficiently isolated from general network operations.
  • Redundancy mechanisms were either misconfigured or not tested.
  • Infrastructure upgrades lacked rigorous pre-deployment testing.
  • Outage reporting to emergency services was delayed or absent.
  • Regulatory enforcement was weak, and compliance was inconsistent.

These issues reflect a broader trend of underinvestment in infrastructure and a lack of accountability in the telecom sector.

What Needs to Change Link to heading

In response to the 2025 outage, government agencies and regulators are pushing for:

  • Mandatory real-time outage alerts to emergency services.
  • Stricter performance standards for emergency call systems.
  • Independent oversight of the Triple Zero ecosystem.
  • Automated testing protocols for all network upgrades.
  • Federal investment in resilient emergency communications infrastructure.

There is also growing support for establishing a national custodian for Triple Zero services to ensure consistent standards and oversight.

Conclusion: A Wake-Up Call Ignored Link to heading

The September 2025 Optus outage is not just a technical failure—it’s a failure of foresight, governance, and responsibility. The fact that similar issues occurred in 2023 and were not fully addressed makes this tragedy even more unacceptable.

Optus now faces public outrage, potential legal consequences, and a loss of trust. More importantly, the incident has sparked a national conversation about the fragility of Australia’s emergency communications infrastructure—and the urgent need for reform.

Key Lessons Learned Link to heading

Emergency Systems Must Be Isolated and Redundant Link to heading

  • Both outages revealed that emergency call routing was not sufficiently isolated from general network operations.
  • The failure of the “camp-on” mechanism in 2025 showed that redundancy systems were either misconfigured or not tested properly.

Lesson: Emergency call systems must be independently managed, with automated failover and cross-network redundancy that is regularly tested.

Real-Time Outage Reporting Is Critical Link to heading

  • In both incidents, Optus delayed notifying emergency services and regulators, which worsened the impact.
  • Lack of transparency during outages led to missed welfare checks and uncoordinated emergency responses.

Lesson: Telcos must implement mandatory real-time outage alerts to emergency services and government agencies.

Infrastructure Upgrades Require Rigorous Testing Link to heading

  • The 2023 outage was caused by a BGP routing error during a software upgrade.
  • The 2025 outage stemmed from a firewall misconfiguration during a routine upgrade.

Lesson: All network changes—especially those affecting core routing or emergency services—must undergo automated pre- and post-deployment testing and rollback planning.

Regulatory Oversight Needs Strengthening Link to heading

  • Despite a government review after the 2023 outage recommending 18 reforms, only 12 were implemented by 2025.
  • The recurrence of similar failures suggests weak enforcement and insufficient accountability.

Lesson: Regulatory bodies must be empowered to enforce compliance, audit emergency systems, and penalize negligence swiftly.

Public Trust Depends on Transparency and Accountability Link to heading

  • Optus’s slow response and lack of communication during both outages led to public outrage and loss of trust.
  • The company failed to conduct welfare checks and did not escalate customer complaints effectively.

Lesson: Telcos must adopt a customer-first crisis communication strategy, including proactive updates, support channels, and public accountability.

Emergency Communications Should Be a National Priority Link to heading

  • The outages exposed the fragility of Australia’s emergency communications infrastructure.
  • Experts are calling for a Triple Zero custodian and federal investment in resilient systems.

Lesson: Emergency communications should be treated as critical national infrastructure, with dedicated oversight, funding, and technical standards.